


























	 One	faction	of	the	pro-Brexit	camp	can	be	seen	as	unsympathetic	to	any	kind	of	protectionist	counter-movement.	Some	globalist	neoliberals	campaigned	for	Leave,	arguing	that	EU	membership	hindered	the	free	play	of	markets	by	imposing	unnecessary	regulations	or	because	of	the	imposition	of	common	tariff	barriers	that	restricted	trade	between	EU	member	states	and	the	rest	of	the	world	(Hannan,	2012).	Some	such	figures,	in	particular	those	associated	with	parts	of	the	financial	sector,	were	motivated	by	hostility	to	European	banking	regulation	developed	since	the	global	financial	crisis,	which	was	perceived	as	undermining	free	markets		(Mooney,	2016).	Others	drew	on	the	unconventional	view	that	‘genuine’	free	trade	could	only	be	achieved	by	leaving	the	EU	and	ridding	the	UK	of	any	tariff	barriers	to	external	trade	(Minford,	2016).	Complaints	about	EU	standards	and	rules	and	their	consequences	for	consumer	items	such	as	lightbulbs,	kettles,	and	bananas	were	a	staple	of	anti-EU	propaganda	that	drew	on	the	idea	of	regulatory	overreach.		 However,	much	of	the	rhetoric	deployed	by	the	various	Leave	campaigners	was	infused	with	protectionist	or	market-curbing	aspirations.	The	most	obvious	of	these	is	hostility	to	the	freedom	of	movement	of	people	across	EU	borders.	Concerns	about	migration	were	tied	to	the	potential	that	the	ease	with	which	non-UK	workers	could	move	to	Britain	in	search	of	work,	subjected	UK	nationals	to	higher	risks	of	unemployment	and	downward	pressure	on	wages.	Although	studies	have	tended	to	show	only	small	or	negligible	effects	of	EU	migration	on	UK	wages	and	employment	(Dustmann,	Fabbri	and	Preston,	2008;	Nickell	and	Saleheen,	2015;	Portes,	2016),	it	seems	that	for	many	Leave	voters,	migration	was	perceived	as	a	threat	to	living	standards,	and	the	Leave	campaign	sought	to	emphasise	this	at	every	opportunity.	The	proposal	to	restrict	access	to	the	UK	labour	market	to	UK	nationals,	by	constraining	free	movement	from	the	EU,	can	be	interpreted	as	a	proposal	to	curb	the	operation	of	the	price	mechanism	of	the	UK	labour	market	by	restricting	supply,	a	clearly	protectionist	move.		 Of	course	opposition	to	freedom	of	movement	was	not	based	solely	an	economic	concerns,	but	also	contained	a	strong	cultural	component,	especially	amongst	older	voters	who	are	less	threatened	by	the	labour	market	consequences	of	migration.	In	areas	of	previously	very	low	migration,	such	as	rural	areas	in	the	East	of	England,	the	big	increases	in	the	Eastern	European	population	appear	to	have	motivated	high	shares	for	Leave	(see	Goodwin	and	Milazzo,	2017).	This	is	also	consistent	with	Polanyi’s	double	movement	thesis,	with	the	broader	social	upheavals	to	‘habitation’	(place	and	community)	a	major	source	of	the	distress	wrought	by	labour	commodification.	Again,	demands	for	restrictions	on	migration	constitute	demands	for	regulation	of	the	labour	market	to	restrict	supply	and	protect	not	only	wages	but	communities	from	the	perceived	threat	of	outsiders.	The	strand	of	the	Leave	campaign	close	to	UKIP	sought	to	connect	fears	of	uncontrolled	immigration	in	general	relating	to	the	Syrian	refugee	crisis	with	EU	freedom	of	movement,	as	in	the	infamous	‘Breaking	Point’	poster	unveiled	by	Nigel	Farage.		A	further	plank	of	discontent	was	the	strain	placed	on	public	services	by	sudden	rapid	increases	in	the	population	in	some	areas	where	migration	increased	quickly.	Pressure	on	housing,	education	and	health	services	purportedly	resulting	from	immigration	was	frequently	invoked	in	Leave	propaganda.	This	pressure	stemmed	at	least	in	part	from	the	austerity	measures	
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inherent	in	the	government’s	deficit	reduction	programme,	and	until	the	referendum	campaign	Cameron	had	avoided	challenging	claims	that	migration,	rather	than	government	cuts,	was	to	blame.	Indeed,	immediately	after	winning	the	2015	election,	the	Prime	Minister	dedicated	a	speech	to	EU	immigration,	arguing	that	‘under	the	free	movement	rules,	national	welfare	systems	can	provide	an	unintended	additional	incentive	for	large	migratory	movements…Changes	to	welfare	to	cut	EU	migration	will	be	an	absolute	requirement	in	the	renegotiation’	(Cameron,	2015).	The	evidence	in	fact	showed	that	migration	from	the	2004	enlargement	countries	was	particularly	fiscally	positive,	whilst	non-EU	migration	was	a	net	negative	(Dustmann	and	Frattini,	2014).		By	accepting	the	fiscal	case	for	cutting	migration,	Cameron	opened	the	door	for	Leave	campaigners	to	exploit	popular	anger	at	austerity	to	mobilise	support	for	Brexit,	by	tying	the	failures	of	the	government’s	deficit	reduction	plan	to	EU	membership.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	governments	since	2010	had	been	aided	by	immigration	in	their	attempts	to	repair	the	damage	to	Britain’s	public	finance	resulting	from	the	financial	crisis,	the	Conservatives	had	adopted	the	contradictory	stance	of	committing	themselves	to	a	reduction	in	net	migration.	As	a	result,	pro-Remain	voices	in	the	government	were	hindered	in	their	ability	to	defend	intra-EU	labour	flows	as	beneficial	for	the	economy,	whilst	Leave	campaigners,	and	in	particular	the	right-wing	press,	consistently	attacked	immigration	as	a	source	of	economic	strain.	Migrants	were	blamed	for	shortages	of	school	places	(Patel,	2016),	a	problem	aggravated	by	the	coalition’s	decision	to	scrap	the	Migrant	Impact	Fund	established	by	the	previous	Labour	government.	Similarly,	pressure	on	the	NHS	was	blamed	on	the	scale	of	migration	(Gove,	Johnson	and	Stuart,	2016),	and	most	notoriously,	several	leading	Leave	figures,	including	leading	Conservatives	Gove,	Duncan	Smith	and	Johnson,	associated	themselves	with	the	misleading	claim	that	EU	membership	cost	Britain	£350	million,	money	that	they	argued	could	be	spent	plugging	gaps	in	the	NHS	budget.	We	can	see	that	the	Brexit	campaign	was	able	to	mobilise	grievances	surrounding	the	visible	failures	of	liberalisation	of	the	labour	market	and	the	fiscal	consequences	of	the	inadequately	regulated	financial	system	to	EU	membership.	Although	there	was	no	real	evidence	that	EU	membership	was	to	blame	in	any	direct	way	for	these	failures,	the	weakness	of	the	Labour	opposition	meant	that	there	was	no	strong	progressive	argument	for	addressing	austerity	and	insecurity	through	social	democracy,	rather	than	economic	nationalism.	The	Labour	party	had	spent	two	decades	freeing	itself	of	a	reputation	for	economic	interventionism,	and	had	embraced	free	markets,	economic	openness	and	enthusiastic	participation	in	the	European	project	in	the	period	before	the	financial	crisis,	leaving	it	with	little	credibility	to	suggest	an	alternative	economic	model.	Similarly	the	Liberal	Democrats,	the	most	openly	pro-European	party,	were	held	back	by	their	involvement	in	the	coalition	government	that	had	opted	for	austerity	under	Cameron.	The	key	beneficiaries	of	this	situation	were	UKIP	and	the	Eurosceptic	right	of	the	Conservative	Party,	who	could	present	themselves	as	offering	the	only	viable	alternative	to	austerity,	insecurity	and	cultural	threat.		 The	referendum	campaign	was	not	limited	to	economic	issues,	and	the	Leave	campaigns	also	emphasised	ideas	of	national	sovereignty	and	democracy,	and	the	problems	they	associated	with	the	UK	having	to	apply	EU	rules,	and	
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accept	the	supremacy	of	EU	law	and	the	rulings	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	The	slogan	‘Take	Back	Control’	invoked	the	promise	of	the	UK	regaining	the	ability	to	take	decisions	and	pass	laws	on	matters	of	concern	without	interference	from	supranational	institutions.	The	Vote	Leave	website	argued:	‘Because	EU	law	is	supreme	over	UK	law	we	cannot	scrap	any	(EU)	rules…This	loss	of	control	is	deeply	damaging	and	undemocratic.	Elections	should	be	about	the	public	choosing	who	makes	the	laws.	Instead,	all	our	politicians	have	to	do	what	the	EU	says	-	not	what	we	say’	(Vote	Leave,	2016).	The	sovereignty	argument	is	not	necessarily	a	protectionist	one,	and	indeed	many	prominent	Leave	campaigners	linked	Brexit	to	greater	economic	openness,	although	usually	in	terms	of	trade	in	goods,	rather	than	the	kinds	of	service	industries	that	would	imply	more	open	borders.	In	this	sense,	the	demand	for	national	sovereignty	can	be	seen	more	broadly	as	a	demand	for	the	reconstitution	of	a	democratic	political	sphere	capable	of	‘taking	back	control’	of	a	series	of	policy	decisions	that	have	been	‘outsourced’	to	supranational	institutions	or	national-level	technocratic	agencies,	and	removed	from	everyday	political	debate	(Mair,	2013).	The	workings	of	the	EU	have	been	subject	to	a	long-running	debate	about	its	‘democratic	deficit’	(see	Follesdal	and	Hix,	2006),		Most	of	the	relevant	areas	subject	to	this	trend	relate	to	the	economy,	both	macroeconomic	tools	such	as	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	and	microeconomic	issues	of	market	regulation.	In	a	global	economy	increasingly	internationalised	and	governed	by	rules	set	at	the	supranational	level,	it	appears	that	economic	policy	escapes	any	form	of	accountable	political	authority	whatsoever	(Blyth,	2003).	The	EU	is	of	course	perhaps	the	clearest	example	of	this,	as	the	UK	and	the	other	member	states	bind	themselves	to	shared	rules,	rules	mostly	informed	by	a	pro-market	vision	which	restricts	the	ability	of	democratically	elected	sovereign	governments	to	intervene	with	market	dynamics.	This	trend	towards	the	‘regulatory	state’	(Majone,	1994)	was	targeted	by	the	Leave	campaign,	not	only	in	its	opposition	to	the	supremacy	of	EU	law,	but	also	in	invoking	hostility	to	unelected	‘experts’,	such	as	Treasury	and	Bank	of	England	officials	who	argued	that	Brexit	would	have	nefarious	consequences	for	the	British	economy	(Mance,	2016).	Whilst	this	demand	for	national	sovereignty	was	not	necessarily	protectionist,	it	was	a	necessary	condition	for	economic	protectionism	to	be	achieved,	and	the	Leave	campaign’s	emphasis	on	immigration	and	the	inability	to	control	it	inside	the	EU	illustrates	a	clear	link	between	national	policy	autonomy,	democracy,	and	protection	from	the	market.	The	EU’s	firm	application	of	the	principle	of	free	movement	of	people	has	been	the	most	glaring	example	and	the	one	most	visible	to	British	voters,	but	similar	arguments	could	be	presented	for	the	other	three	freedoms	too.	The	UK	government	would	not	be	able	to	protect	British	goods	and	services	from	the	competitive	Europe-wide	market	even	if	it	wished	to,	due	to	state	aid	rules	and	regulatory	convergence.	These	competitive	pressures	have	led	to	weaker	companies	failing,	and	can	be	seen	as	driving	a	race	to	the	bottom	in	social	provision	and	labour	market	regulation	in	an	attempt	to	maintain	competitiveness.	Similarly,	freedom	of	movement	of	capital	has	exposed	Britain	to	financial	volatility	and	fuelled	part	of	the	housing	boom	which	has	destabilized	the	household	economy	of	British	families.	The	minority	‘Lexit’	strand	of	pro-Leave	thinking	emphasised	these	arguments.	The	exposure	of	British	society	to	market	forces	has	been	driven	
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predominantly	by	decisions	taken	by	successive	British	governments,	and	European	integration	has	been	reconciled	with	high	levels	of	social	protection	elsewhere	in	the	EU.	However	the	feeling	of	‘loss	of	control’	that	was	expertly	exploited	by	the	Leave	campaign	can	be	seen	as	the	consequence	of	a	quarter-century	long	process	of	liberalisation	driven	by	both	British	politicians	and	the	forces	of	economic	internationalisation	and	European	political	cooperation.	The	demand	to	‘take	back	control’	is	in	part	a	demand	for	protection	from	a	globalized	market	economy,	and	a	plea	to	re-embed	the	market	in	the	national	social	fabric.		
5.	Support	for	Brexit:	A	Vote	Against	the	Market?		Having	shown	how	the	main	messages	of	the	Leave	campaign	were	consistent	with	protectionist	and	anti-market	thinking,	it	still	remains	to	be	demonstrated	that	Brexit	won	support	on	this	basis.	This	section	will	assess	the	electoral	and	political	characteristics	of	the	Brexit	vote	with	a	view	to	showing	how	they	reflect	unease	at	the	incursion	of	market	dynamics	into	social	life.	This	unease	was	a	product	both	of	material	economic	distress	and	the	more	cultural	and	social	upheavals	related	to	migratory	movements	as	the	UK	labour	market	recruited	large	numbers	of	workers	from	other	EU	member	states.			 The	most	straightforward	reason	for	seeing	Brexit	as	articulating	an	anti-market	counter-movement	is	its	appeal	to	lower	income,	less	educated	voters	in	poorer	areas	of	the	UK.	This	‘left	behind’	thesis	(Ford	and	Goodwin,	2014)	holds	that	support	for	UKIP	in	recent	elections	is	driven	largely	by	older,	less	educated,	working	class	men	who	are	generally	losers	from	economic	change	and	feel	threatened	or	irritated	by	cultural	changes	brought	by	immigration	and	the	rise	of	liberal	cultural	values.	The	available	evidence	on	the	2016	referendum	voters	suggests	these	same	characteristics	were	also	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote,	suggesting	that	economic	hardship	was	driving	the	result.	Leave	voting	decreased	with	income,	and	also	with	educational	qualifications,	both	of	which	are	indicators	of	individual	exposure	to	economic	risks	(Clarke,	Goodwin	and	Whiteley,	2017).	As	Goodwin	and	Heath	(2016)	summarized,	vulnerability	to	poverty,	unemployment,	low	skills,	and	perceptions	that	one’s	financial	situation	had	deteriorated	over	the	recent	period	were	all	strong	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote,	a	patterns	consistent	with	the	double	movement	hypothesis.		The	importance	of	economic	distress	can	also	be	seen	in	the	geography	of	the	vote.	Outside	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	Remain	polled	comfortable	majorities	only	in	London	and	prosperous	smaller	cities	such	as	Oxford,	Cambridge,	or	Brighton,	usually	with	higher	incomes	and	much	higher	shares	of	university	graduates	than	the	UK	average	(Goodwin	and	Heath,	2016).	In	contrast,	very	high	shares	of	Leave	votes	were	found	predominantly	in	poorer,	former	manufacturing	areas	of	England	and	Wales.	Colantone	and	Stanig	(2016)	find	that	Leave	voting	was	higher	in	areas	most	exposed	to	heightened	global	economic	competition.	The	effects	of	long-term	economic	decline	were	compounded	by	the	short-term	consequences	of	fiscal	austerity.	Labour’s	expansion	of	public	spending	up	to	the	crisis	had	mitigated	the	effects	of	the	decline	of	manufacturing,	but	harsh	constraints	on	public	spending	on	social	protection	after	2010	had	their	greatest	effect	in	those	areas.	The	Leave	vote	was	strongest	in	regions	which	suffered	the	greatest	spending	cuts	(Harrop	2016,	
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Becker,	Fetzer	and	Novy	2016).	The	three	areas	with	strong	support	for	Remain	-	London,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	–	are	all	territories	with	devolved	administrations	and	favourable	public	spending	arrangements	(Phillips,	2014),	leading	to	an	attenuated	impact	of	austerity	measures	(although	the	Remain	vote	in	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	was	clearly	also	linked	to	identity	and	constitutional	concerns).			 Age	was	also	a	strong	predictor	of	the	Leave	vote.	Tangled	up	with	the	other	key	variables	of	education,	which	declines	with	age	cohort	in	the	UK,	and	also	to	some	extent	income	(pensioners	having	lower	income	than	prime	working	age	citizens),	age	appears	to	have	an	independent	effect.	This	has	been	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	a	cultural	backlash	against	globalisation,	increasing	immigration,	and	rapid	shifts	in	cultural	norms	(authoritarian	views	on	issue	such	as	family	life	and	the	death	penalty	are	strong	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote	[Kaufmann,	2016,	Inglehart	and	Norris	2016]).	The	younger	cohort	voted	decisively	to	Remain,	despite	facing	much	greater	economic	insecurity,	at	least	in	the	short	term,	than	the	older	population.	The	strong	Leave	vote	amongst	pensioners,	whose	incomes	have	risen	more	quickly	than	the	working	age	population	since	the	financial	crisis,	could	suggest	that	for	many	voters	the	cultural	ramifications	of	rapid	shifts	in	population	driven	by	labour	market	trends	were	as	important	as	material	economic	factors.	However	older	voters	are	also	disproportionately	dependent	on	public	spending	on	pensions,	health	and	social	care,	and	were	therefore	directly	affected	by	austerity,	particularly	in	its	effects	on	public	services.	The	predominance	of	older	voters	in	the	Leave	camp,	alongside	the	clear	evidence	of	public	disquiet	over	immigration,	has	led	some	scholars	to	dismiss	the	economic	motivations	for	Brexit	in	favour	of	a	more	cultural	explanation.	As	the	NatCen	report	into	the	vote	described,	‘the	Leave	victory	was	not	about	demographics	alone…	matters	of	identity	were	equally,	if	not	more	strongly	associated	with	the	Leave	vote	–	particularly	feelings	of	national	identity	and	sense	of	change	in	Britain	over	time’	(Swales,	2016).	Clearly	immigration	was	a	touchstone	issue,	and	high	levels	of	concern	about	immigration	since	the	mid-2000s	clearly	fuelled	the	pressure	for	a	referendum,	and	contributed	to	the	Leave’s	success.	NatCen’s	data	showed	that	immigration	was	the	second	most	important	issue	for	voters	after	the	economy	(Swales,	2016:	13),	and	Clarke,	Goodwin	and	Whiteley’s	(2017)	analysis	suggested	attitudes	towards	immigration	were	important	predictors	of	the	Leave	vote.	Moreover,	although	Leave-voting	areas	on	average	had	low	shares	of	migrants	in	the	population	than	Remain-voting	areas,	the	rate	of	increase	of	immigration	was	a	predictor	of	Leave	vote	(Goodwin	and	Milazzo,	2017).		Economics	and	identity	are	often	presented	as	opposing	hypotheses	in	the	debate	on	the	rise	of	populism	(Norris	and	Inglehart,	2016;	Curtice,	2016).	This	analytical	distinction	is	misleading:	the	political	economy	of	the	post-crisis	period	in	the	UK	brought	together	wage	stagnation,	reductions	in	social	expenditure,	greater	economic	security	and	high	levels	of	migration	as	part	of	the	same	process	of	economic	adjustment.	These	different	factors	can	be	separated	analytically	and	measured	through	separate	survey	questions,	but	the	surveys	do	not	tell	us	whether	voter	concerns	about	immigration	were	driven	by	predominantly	cultural	or	economic	motives.	Hobolt	(2016)	shows	that	whilst	economic	risks	were	an	important	motivation	for	the	Remain	vote,	Leave	voters	
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justified	their	choice	in	terms	of	immigration	and	sovereignty.	The	socio-demographic	characteristics	of	Leave	voters	are	clearly	related	to	their	social	attitudes	–	a	preference	for	cultural	homogeneity	and	traditional	values	correlate	with	low	levels	of	education	and	therefore	exposure	to	the	sharp	end	of	labour	market	competition	with	migrants,	although	the	real	measurable	effects	of	this	competition	appear	small.	We	can	conclude	that	the	dramatic	changes	brought	by	globalisation	and	European	integration,	the	extension	of	market	relationships	to	new	areas	of	social	life,	and	the	acute	shock	to	material	living	standards	resulting	from	the	financial	crisis,	produced	a	powerful	political	counter-movement.	The	Brexit	vote	displays	the	characteristics	of	a	protest	against	the	social,	economic	and	cultural	consequences	of	a	long	process	of	marketisation	of	the	British	economy,	which	reached	its	own	‘breaking	point’	after	the	financial	crisis.				
6.	Conclusions		This	article	has	presented	the	vote	for	Brexit	as	an	expression	of	an	anti-market	‘counter-movement’,	drawing	on	Karl	Polanyi’s	account	of	the	double	movement	of	market	liberalization	and	anti-market	political	movements	in	the	nineteenth	and	first	half	of	the	twentieth	centuries.	I	have	argued	that	the	wave	of	pro-market	policy	since	the	1980s,	both	at	the	UK	level	and	supranationally	through	the	EU,	has	generated	a	political	reaction,	catalysed	by	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	and	resulting	austerity.	Interpretation	of	the	key	messages	of	the	Leave	campaign	and	the	characteristics	of	the	most	likely	Brexit	voters	confirms	that	the	project	of	leaving	the	EU	was	in	large	part	a	protectionist	one,	and	that	exposure	to	the	hard	edges	of	the	market	reforms	of	the	past	decades	was	a	strong	predictor	of	openness	to	this	project.		The	vote	for	Brexit	is	not	an	isolated	event,	but	part	of	a	wave	of	populist,	anti-elite	revolts:	a	new	‘anti-system’	politics	Western	democracies	are	experiencing,	shaking	the	existing	consensus	around	economic	integration,	free	markets	and	liberal	values.	This	wave	takes	a	variety	of	forms,	but	has	in	common	a	robust,	even	violent,	rejection	of	the	mainstream	political	elites	and	their	values,	and	a	demand	for	governments	to	act	on	the	sources	of	social	and	economic	distress	and	inequality.	This	article	views	Brexit	as	a	part	of	a	new	anti-system	politics,	a	reaction	to	the	increasing	impotence	of	established	political	elites	to	address	the	upheavals	wrought	by	global	market	capitalism.	This	reaction	has	become	particularly	acute	since	the	financial	crisis	of	the	late	2000s,	which	affected	Britain	disproportionately,	and	the	failure	of	austerity	policies	to	revive	growth,	crystallising	the	ineffectiveness	of	existing	policies	to	deal	with	economic	stagnation.		This	policy	failure	is	compounded	by	a	perceived	refusal	of	politicians	to	engage	with	the	broader	public,	and	a	lack	of	real	choice	between	the	mainstream	political	parties.		What	is	especially	striking	about	the	referendum	and	its	aftermath	is	that	the	UK	appears	to	be	a	country	viscerally	divided	on	fundamental	issues	of	economic	organisation,	international	relations	and	even	the	very	survival	of	the	UK	state	itself.	Yet	politics	since	the	early	1990s	had	revolved	around	a	broad	consensus	of	the	main	political	parties	on	all	these	issues,	a	consensus	which	is	now	falling	apart	in	the	face	of	the	evidence	of	
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intense	political	polarization	in	the	population.	Brexit	expresses	one	side	of	this	divide,	but	the	spectacular	growth	of	Scottish	nationalism	and	the	radicalisation	of	the	Labour	party	also	express	deep-seated	discontent	at	how	Britain	is	currently	governed.	The	liberal,	pro-market	consensus	of	the	1990s	and	2000s	is	now	a	minority	position,	besieged	by	the	demands	of	social	forces	of	both	left	and	right	for	protection	from	uncontrolled	markets.	This	scenario	would	not	have	surprised	Karl	Polanyi.		 									
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